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This paper studies how the dynamics of democratization inﬂuence
the design of constitutions and political institutions. The process of
democratization is shown to be determined by inequality in economic
and political power, as well as the dynamics of economic development,
while, at the same time, democratic structures shape the economic en-
vironment. We show that diﬀerent scenarios of political development.
can arise and lead to diﬀerent constitutional designs. These shape in
particular the relative importance of eﬃciency and redistribution in
the activities of the public sector, depending on the relative power
and interests of diﬀerent groups during the transition. Constitutions
written under a strong capitalistic elite are characterized by little re-
distribution and a small size of the government. The reverse holds
for strongly landed and less entrenched elites. The various implica-
tions of the model are shown to be in line with empirical and historical
evidence.
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The importance of political institutions is widely recognized in social sci-
ences. Modern democracies are characterized by a complex set of rules
which govern social interactions and the resolution of conﬂicts of interests.
These institutions play an important role in shaping the state’s interven-
tions in the marketplace. A substantial literature in political economy and
political science studies the eﬀects of diﬀerent political institutions regulat-
ing the aggregation of individual preferences. This includes, among others,
investigations of the eﬀects of the political system (democracy vs dictator-
ship), the role of voting systems (majoritarian vs consensual), of the form of
government (parlamentay vs presidential), or of the form of state (unitary vs
federal) to name a few, as well as their implications for various governmen-
tal activities and economic performance in general, see e.g. Persson, Roland,
and Tabellini (2000) as well as two recent books by Persson and Tabellini
(2003) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for a survey of theories and empirical
evidence.
Several ﬁndings emerge. First, the rules governing the aggregation of
conﬂictual interests, in a word the political institutions, are not neutral.
These rules have a ﬁrst order eﬀect on the economic performance and the
growth possibilities of a community as a whole and on the relative well being
of its various members. Second, institutions appear to exhibit a large degree
of persistence and path dependence, compare for example the discussion
of the diﬀerences between the U.S. and continental Europe provided by
Alesina and Glaeser (2004), who document the long term eﬀects of the
early constitutional stages.1 Third, institutions are designed by rational
individuals with well deﬁned and conﬂicting interests. Constitutions are not
written under the veil of ignorance, but they reﬂect the interests and relative
bargaining power of the diﬀerent parties involved in their design.
Two important questions naturally arise from these ﬁndings: why and
how did diﬀerent political systems or constitutions emerge? While the im-
plications of diﬀerent systems have been systematically analyzed, much less
is known about why the political systems arose in the form they did. The
question of why countries democratize(d) in the ﬁrst place has triggered sub-
stantial research eﬀort, particular in the political sciences, but it appears far
from being a settled issue. The diﬀerent available economic theories of de-
mocratization highlight diﬀerent channels of transition from oligarchy to
democracy. In a series of articles, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001,
2003, 2004) emphasize the role of coups and suggest that the threat of a
1There are various theoretical explanations why constitutions require a large consensus
to be changed, and why it may be optimal to render constitutions diﬃcult to change.
Compare, for example, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) for a rationale for the existence of
status quo bias, and Gradstein (1999) and Messner and Polborn (2004) for rationales for
supermajority rules.
1revolution might have been be crucial in inducing incumbent elites to give
up their monopoly of political power and extend the franchise to larger
groups of the population. Democracy essentially serves the role of a com-
mitment device since the under oligarchy the elite cannot credibly commit
to future redistribution. The elite receives no intrinsic gains from democ-
ratization but it is forced ‘from below’ to concede power and, eventually,
redistribute to the poor. Another line of research highlights the productive
function of democratic government and argues that it was actually in the
interest of the elite itself to democratize. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) show
that in some cases, like England, democratization might have actually been
in the elite’s own interest, since, for example, the provision of public goods,
or the avoidance of ineﬃcient rent-seeking and corrupt behavior was easier
under democracy than under oligarchy due to the stronger checks and bal-
ances, and the possibility to spread responsibility on more shoulders. An
alternative argument, why the elite might prefer to give up its monopoly in
political power, based on superior possibilities of property rights protection
under democracy is provided by Gradstein (2004b). In contrast to the pre-
viously mentioned line of argument, the latter papers provide arguments for
the elite implementing democracy ‘from above’ to reap the beneﬁts of that
form of government but without being, strictly speaking, under a serious
treat of a revolution or coup.2 As a corollary, the theories of democrati-
zation ‘from below’ underline the redistributive role of democracies, while
theories of democratization ‘from above’ emphasize the productive role of
public good and service provision.
The second question concerning how constitutions were designed, and
why political institutions have been shaped the way we observe them has
been the focus of a few recent contributions. Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi
(2004) study the optimal constitutional size of a minority required to block
legislation, and conversely the size of the supermajority needed to pass legis-
lation. Ticchi and Vindigni (2003) address the choice between a majoritarian
and a consensual democracy made by a rich elite and show that the elite is
likely to choose a majoritarian democracy the larger the (exogenous) degree
of inequality. These studies, which are inherently static in nature, provide a
deeper economic understanding of the reasons for the emergence of diﬀerent
political institutions. Gradstein (2004a) develops a dynamic model of the
emergence of property rights protection in the context of economic develop-
ment, emphasizing the idea that property rights protection becomes more
important as an economy develops. This eﬀect might have played a role in
the democratization and the extension of the franchise in many countries,
and contributed to the extent of property rights protection implemented in
their political system, as argued in a related paper by the same author, see
2A similar argument why the extension of the franchise can be in the interest of those
in oligarchic power can be found in the paper by Oxoby and Llavador (2004).
2Gradstein (2004b).
In this paper we argue that the joint consideration of the both ques-
tions, why and how, allows to make further steps towards understanding the
endogeneity of political institutions. While it is certainly true that the pro-
cess of institution building is incremental overtime, it is possible to identify
key periods for the formation of political institutions in the history of each
country. In a very long run perspective as the one adopted here, democ-
ratization can therefore be interpreted as a unique event characterized by
the abolition of oligarchic states. The understanding of the driving forces of
this transition is crucial for the understanding of the actual constitutional
designs emerging.
This paper provides a simple theory of endogenous political institutions
(constitutions) based on the interaction between the intertwined processes
of economic development and democratization. The transition to democ-
racy is seen as an endogenous event. Depending on the speciﬁc economic
environment and history, diﬀerent development paths, ‘transition regimes’,
can arise endogenously. We consider a dynamic framework in which ini-
tially an elite of landowners has all political decision rights and in this sense
rules over the landless people. However, the population in general, and the
elite in particular, has always the option to switch to a democratic regime
with universal political representation, public good provision and ﬁscal re-
distribution. Democratization takes place when either the elite gains from
it or when it is forced to give power away. The elite oﬀers a democratiza-
tion (from above) only when it is in its own interest. This happens once
the process of development makes democracy a suﬃciently eﬃcient system
compared to oligarchy. To concentrate attention on the main driving forces
we abstract from modeling constitutional details and concentrate attention
on the main functions of a government. We distinguish the two main in-
tentional purposes of the state by referring to (eﬃciency enhancing) public
good provision on the one hand, and to (fairness enhancing) redistribution
on the other. The idea is that the choice of actual constitutional details can
be subsumed in the choice of a certain balance between public good pro-
vision (eﬃciency) and redistribution (fairness). Under these conditions the
elite is prone to constitutions with limits to redistribution and with large
shares of public spending going to the provision of public goods and in-
frastructure (which are eﬃciency enhancing), as well as substantial barriers
to constitutional amendments in terms of enlarging redistribution and the
welfare state. Nearly the opposite happens in democracies that arise as con-
sequence of a democratization ‘from below’. In this case the elite does not
ﬁnd democracy proﬁtable and is not particularly interested in public good
provision. Also the bargaining power of the elites is necessarily smaller at
the time of transition, i.e. when the constitution is written. As a result the
constitution is characterized by no limits to redistribution.
The central result is that democracies arising under diﬀerent democ-
3ratization processes are fundamentally diﬀerent, and that the process of
democratization crucially aﬀects the path of future economic development
as well. In particular, the relative power and interests of the various pop-
ulation groups at the time of transition towards a democracy is reﬂected
in the constitution, which is written to regulate the democracy. The eco-
nomic environment determines the the timing of and the conditions under
which the transition takes place, rendering democratization essentially en-
dogenous. These conditions themselves shape the constitutions in terms
of size and structure of the public sector through the incentives and con-
straints faced by the ‘founding fathers’, that is, by the generation during
which the democratic transition occurs. As is well known, the institutional
environment in turn crucially aﬀects economic outcomes, which therefore
reﬂects the power politics at the outset of democratization. Therefore, the
actual political institutions (addressed by the question how constitutions
were designed) are closely linked to the relative power and interests of the
diﬀerent groups at the moment of democratization which in turn depends on
the actual circumstances of democratization (and hence to the question why
countries democratized). Our approach delivers testable implications con-
cerning the eﬀects of the speciﬁc economic and political environment during
a transition phase on the constitutional design, and the consequential size
and structure of the public sector. We argue that actual diﬀerences between
Anglo-saxon and continental European constitutions can be traced back to
the diﬀerent democratization histories.
This paper is therefore at the intersection of several branches of lit-
erature. In this paper, we provide a theory of endogenous democratization
which depends on the degree of inequality and technical progress and identi-
ﬁes the conditions under which the diﬀerent forces identiﬁed in the literature
should be expected to operate. Moreover, we relate this endogenous process
to the emergence of diﬀerent constitutions, and interpret actual diﬀerences
between constitutions and institutional systems in a historical perspective,
thus contributing to the current debate concerning the reasons for the signif-
icant diﬀerences between, e.g., the U.S. and Europe, both of which, despite
being characterized by apparently similar economic fundamentals, exhibit
substantially diﬀerent social contracts in terms of redistribution and public
good provision.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic economic
framework and the potential for political conﬂict. Section 3 analyzes the
model and presents the major result, a characterization of the interactions
between economic and political development of an economy. Section 4 dis-
cusses the model implications in a historical perspective and presents some
empirical ﬁndings corroborating the theory, and section 5 concludes.
42 The Basic Framework
This section presents the economic environment, and the decision problem
faced by individuals with diﬀerent factor endowments. We then introduce
and discuss the potential for political conﬂict that arises in this economy.
2.1 Economic Environment
We consider an economy that is populated by an inﬁnite sequence of subse-
quent generations t of individuals i. Each individual has one parent and one
oﬀspring, there are no fertility decisions to be made. Consequently, there is
no population growth over generations, with the size of each generation being
Lt = L. During their life, individuals inelastically supply one unit of labor
on the labor market, and earn in exchange a competitively determined wage
for their labor input. We abstract from labor-leisure choices. Moreover, in-
dividuals are endowed with physical capital, which they inherit as bequests
from their parents. A fraction 0 < ° < 1=2 of individuals is also endowed
with land, while all the land is distributed equally among land-owners. In-





t) = (1 ¡ ¯)logci
t + ¯ logbi
t : (1)
All individuals therefore optimally choose to spend a constant fraction (1¡¯)
of their individual income yi
t on consumption, such that ci
t = (1¡¯)yi
t, while
they bequeath the rest of their income to their oﬀspring, hence bi
t = ¯yi
t.
To keep things simple, we assume that bequests can only be invested into
physical capital K, and that, conversely, capital can only be created through
investing the bequests of the preceding generation. There is no other pos-
sibility to invest resources in capital formation. At the end of a genera-
tion’s lifetime, its capital fully depreciates. Consequently, the capital stock




t¡1. Land resources are ready to use for production for their
owners. Moreover, land does not depreciate. Land is bequeathed from gen-
eration to generation, and there is no market for land.4 For lack of other
utility relevant uses, individuals will use all their factor endowments for pro-
duction by selling them on the respective factor markets, in order to generate
3This formulation of the utility function is not crucial for the main insights, but simpli-
ﬁes the analysis considerably. It is noteworthy, however, that the development dynamics
of the economy, as shown below, essentially depend on the distribution of factor endow-
ments, and hence the decision on consumption and bequest, which in reality may diﬀer
across diﬀerent groups of the society.
4This assumption is without loss of generality. In fact, as will become clear below, even
allowing for land markets would not change the results. See also Cervellati, Fortunato,
and Sunde (2004) for a fully speciﬁed model in which selling or buying land using e.g.
bequests is always a (weakly) dominated strategy.
5income. Individual incomes are thus determined by the respective endow-
ments and the corresponding factor prices realized on the competitive factor
markets. For notational convenience, we denote aggregate variables by up-
per case letters, and individual variables by lower case letters. Consequently,
the aggregate resources available in the economy during the existence of gen-




and land N. Also, we introduce the following notation for average per capita
variables: average individual incomes yt = Yt=L, average capital endowment
kt = Kt=L, and average land endowment n = N=L.
The economy is fully competitive, and all resources are employed in the
production of a single commodity Y according to a production technology
exhibiting constant returns to scale of the form
Yt = [(1 + Gt)AtKt + N]
® L(1¡®) : (2)
Besides the resource inputs, production is aﬀected by a productivity index
At, which reﬂects the technological state of the art of production, and by
a productivity enhancing public good Gt, which reﬂects for example infras-
tructure. Public goods provision is discussed in more detail in the next
section. Technological progress, as implied by the production function, rel-
atively favors capital-intensive production as opposed to land-intensive pro-
duction. This is expressed by the fact that productivity of physical capital
in the form of A changes over the course of generations, while that of land
remains constant and is normalized to 1. To keep the model simple, and
since we are not interested in analyzing the determinants of productivity
growth, we assume that technological innovations arrive only with the birth




= at = a 8 t : (3)
The production function is formally equivalent to the production of a homo-
geneous commodity in two distinct sectors, one employing exclusively land
resources together with labor, and the other exclusively physical capital to-
gether with labor, like the one discussed in Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde
(2004).6 Since the economy is competitive, all factors are paid according to
their marginal products. For convenience, we normalize population size to
1 in what follows, such that Lt = 1 8t. Hence, equilibrium factor prices in
terms of wages, capital rents and land rents, in the economy are given by
wt = (1 ¡ ®)[(1 + Gt)Atkt + n]
® ; (4)
rt = ®[(1 + Gt)Atkt + n]
®¡1 (1 + Gt)At ; (5)
and ½t = ®[(1 + Gt)Atkt + n]
®¡1 ; (6)
5Endogenizing the rate of technical progress would not aﬀect the main argument.
6Also Acemoglu and Robinson (2003) use the speciﬁcation used for the production
technology in equation (2).
6respectively. The production technology is therefore able to replicate the
permanent growth in capital stocks and incomes experienced by most coun-
tries in the western world. Moreover, while the implied income share of labor
is stable over generations, as was the case in history, the incomes generated
by capital grow at the expense of the incomes generated by land over the
course of development, see also Acemoglu and Robinson (2003). Individual
incomes, which can be allocated optimally to consumption and bequests, are
determined by the individual resources employed in the production process
and the respective rents accrueing to them. Hence, all individuals earn a
labor income plus a capital income. Those individuals i belonging to the
fraction ° of the population owning land, which we denote in the following
by i 2 E and refer to as the ‘landlord elite’, additionally own income from
renting out their land to the production process. Note that due to the equal
distribution of land among the elite, every landowner has land resources of
nE = n=°. On the other hand, members of the group without land, the
landless people or ‘proletariat’, i 2 P, have no land, so nP = 0, and hence
also enjoy no incomes from land resources. Individual gross incomes can
thus be written as
yi
t = wt + rtki
t + ½tni
t with i 2 fE;Pg : (7)
Substituting with the expressions for equilibrium factor prices given by con-
ditions (4), (5) and (6), and denoting eﬀective physical capital as ˜ kt(Gt),
with
˜ kt (Gt) := (1 + Gt)Atkt ; (8)
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This immediately implies that average per capita income in the economy
can be calculated as yt =
³
˜ kt(Gt) + n
´®
.
2.2 Institutions and the Public Sector
Next, consider the role of the state. The main purpose of the model is to
provide a simple model that allows to characterize the dynamic interdepen-
dencies between economic development and political development in terms
of democratization. Political decisions are essentially made along two dimen-
sions, the size and the structure of the state in form of the budget and its
use. The total budget is given by tax revenues R. Political decisions always
aﬀect also the use of this budget, which is subject to the fundamental trade-
oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity. Eﬃciency-enhancing activities of the state
7are represented by the provision of a public good G, which enters the pro-
duction function (2) in the form of higher productivity of physical capital.
On the other hand, the state can pursue equity-driven activities, condensed
as purely non-productive lump-sum redistribution in form of transfers T,
which are equally distributed among the population. We assume that there
are no ineﬃciencies aﬀecting either public good provision or redistribution,
in the sense that neither of these two uses of tax revenues implies a waste
of income. Rather, every unit of income used for public good provision pro-
duces one unit of public good, and likewise for redistribution. The budget
must be balanced for every generation, since there are no capital markets
allowing for intergenerational loans and debt. The budget is ﬁnanced by
proportional income taxation, implying a budget of the state for a given
generation of individuals of
Rt = ¿Yt ¸ Gt + Tt : (10)
Note that we abstract from timing issues regarding production, taxation of
income and public goods provision or redistribution. Rather, this formula-
tion is meant to highlight the role of the size and structure of the public
sector for individuals, while they themselves have to decide about both di-
mensions. Meanwhile, intergenerational issues are neglected, since they do
not add fundamental insights to the main argument of our paper.7 In the
following, the tax rate ¿ required to ﬁnance the public sector, as well as the
amounts of redistributive transfers T, and public goods G to be provided by
the public sector, are determined as the outcome of a political process to be
speciﬁed next. Of course, given ¿ and G and the respective total production
outcome Y , R as well as the size of the redistributive component of the
public sector T are determined residually, so that by choosing two variables
the size and structure of the public sector are fully determined.
2.3 Political Conﬂict and Timing of Events
Size and structure of the public sector are chosen by the respective group
of the population that is in power. Hence, power itself is deﬁned as the
possibility to decide upon issues such as public goods provision and redis-
tribution. Public sector variables are essentially determined by the median
voter of the respective electorate. Individuals are only heterogeneous with
respect to whether they own land or not, and hence there are only two
political regimes: oligarchy, where one group of individuals has exclusive
political power, while the other group has no vote; and democracy, where
7One could argue that also in reality, by projecting future budgets, democratically
elected governments adhere to a similar reverse timing with respect to production, tax-
ation and spending the tax revenues on redistribution or public goods, which aﬀect the
production process itself.
8all individuals, regardless of their status with respect to land-ownership, en-
joy suﬀrage. Despite having exclusive decision power, we assume that an
oligarchic elite cannot forcefully tax and expropriate the politically subordi-
nate class. Hence, if the elite desires a budget for some purpose, for example
the provision of productive public goods, it can only ﬁnance the required
tax revenues itself, but not force non-elitist people to participate. A crucial
feature of democracy is the fact that the rules of the ‘democratic game’ are
ﬁxed and known to everyone, in particular when it comes to making collec-
tive decisions, such as the size and structure of the state. The distinction
to oligarchy in this respect is that the ruling oligarchic elite sets the rules
itself, and hence can change them unilaterally, e.g. decide autonomously on
the amount of public good provision. This is not possible under democracy.
Rather, the constitution regulates the political institutions, and the consti-
tution is not easily changeable. However, constitutions are not exogenously
given, but designed by the ‘founding fathers’ of the democratic state. Hence,
the circumstances at the moment of democratization in terms of economic
environment as well as proportions of political (and conﬂict) power crucially
aﬀect the details laid down in the constitution. But, as will turn out, these
details have substantial consequences for future development. For example,
the constitution may contain an upper limit to the share of government
spending on redistributive purposes. Since such details are literally cast in
stone, and, again by constitution, very diﬃcult to amend, they have far
reaching consequences.
In order to make the conﬂicts of interest explicit, and to elicit the main
message of the model in a very clear way, assume that, whatever regime is
in place, the landlords, that is, the richer class due to higher endowments,
have an incentive to eﬀectively curb redistribution. Under a landlord oli-
garchy, this poses no particular problem since the elite can determine T as
well as the optimal level of public good provision G, both of which landlords
have to fully ﬁnance themselves, and hence completely determine the public
sector. Under democracy, on the other hand, the constitution sets the rules
for redistribution and public good provision. Let the level of public good
provision G be determined by majority rule. Since ° < 1=2, this means
that it is essentially chosen by a member of the landless, the group of the
median voter. However, knowing this, the elite will try to limit redistri-
bution and implement the optimal level of public good provision by setting
constitutional boundaries to redistribution, like an upper limit T < ¯ T, when
the constitution is implemented. The main results of our model derive from
analyzing diﬀerent regimes of transition towards democracy implying diﬀer-
ent potential for the elite to inﬂuence the constitution in terms of limiting
redistribution.8
8As will be shown below, the results do not depend on the fact that the elite tries to
inﬂuence the rules for redistribution T, while then G is chosen in a voting process. Rather,
alternative settings, where e.g. the elite attempts to limit the size of the states by choosing
9Following the historical experience, we assume that initially political
suﬀrage was conﬁned to the land-owning elite only, implying an oligarchy
of landowners. Of course, there are possibilities to change the political
regime. Clearly, the respective ruling elite can oﬀer to give up exclusive
political power and extend the suﬀrage to other individuals as well.9 On
the other hand, if this is not the case, the politically excluded may try
to obtain power by going to open conﬂict and violently challenging the
ruling elite. To model this possibility, we adopt a ‘guns model’, according to
which the winner of an open conﬂict, if it arises, is determined by the group
with preponderance in ﬁghting power. Fighting power is determined by all
the resources, people, and physical capital that are available to a speciﬁc
group. In the current context, there are only two observationally distinct






, while the people are able to set free a ﬁghting power of (1¡°)KP
t .10
Note that realizing ﬁghting power eﬀectively and credibly does not require
any investments. Rather, the resources can be thought of as being fully
reversible, leading to conﬂict potential that can be mobilized instantaneously
and costlessly in the case an open conﬂict occurs. Consequently, the outcome







In other words, the elite prevails with its political will if they have more
conﬂict potential, i.e. if the left hand side is larger than (or equal to) the
right hand side, while the people enforce their desired political system if the
opposite is true. Note that, depending on the relative beneﬁts of the two
systems in terms of incomes, the landless, if they are able to win an open
conﬂict, can implement democracy, that is, merely extend the franchise, or
implement an oligarchy to its own favor.11
The timing of events faced by every generation t, as depicted in Figure 1
for the example of an oligarchy of the landlord elite, can be summarized as
follows. After birth, the respective elite can either decide to remain in power
and opt for the status quo, or to make a democratic oﬀer. This oﬀer implies
a maximal tax rate ¯ ¿, or alternatively two stage procedures, in which both groups ﬁrst
bargain about the constitutional rules for the size of the state and then, conditional on this
outcome, on the distribution of tax revenues on public good provision and redistribution,
imply the same results.
9We exclude the possibility of discretionary extension of suﬀrage to particular persons,
and assume that it can only be done regarding entire groups. In other words, apart from
land ownership, there is no, potentially ‘unobservable’, heterogeneity of individuals.
10Including land resources as a means of generating conﬂict potential analogously to
physical capital would lead to identical results.
11As shown elsewhere, see Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde (2004), the qualitative
results with respect to the characterization of the dynamic path of development do not
change, even if expropriation of land were possible.
10an extension of suﬀrage to the respectively politically excluded group, with
the possibility to inﬂuence the democratic frame. In particular, we assume
that the democratic oﬀer implies the possibility to implement an explicit
upper limit to redistribution ¯ T. People, on the other hand, can then either
choose to accommodate that proposal, or to challenge it by going to open
conﬂict.12 Once the conﬂict is resolved, the consequential political system
materializes, and production takes place under this system, in particular,
under the resulting taxation, and the public good provision and redistribu-
tion schemes that are implemented. Eventually, people consume or bequeath
their remaining net income, and die. This completes the description of the
model.

















3 Development, Democratization, and their Inter-
dependencies
This section ﬁrst establishes some basic results concerning the dynamics
of the development process and provides an analysis of the decision prob-
lems faced by members of the diﬀerent groups in the economy. Using these
results, we then turn to the characterization of the processes of economic
and political development, and highlight their interdependencies by consid-
ering development as the succession of generations and their political and
economic decisions within an evolving environment.
From the exogenous productivity growth given by (3), and the fact that
capital is only created through bequests it follows that both incomes and
capital endowments are increasing from generation to generation. This is
true regardless of the political regime, and of whether landowners or land-
less are concerned. The ﬁrst useful result concerns the evolution of capital
12Note that this description of timing is without loss of generality. In particular, the
same timing holds under democracy, where the ‘ruling elite’ consists of all people pop-
ulating the economy. Clearly, they will oﬀer to maintain the democratic status quo on
the ﬁrst stage. And clearly, there is, maybe apart from some odd idiosyncratic chaps, no
opposition against keeping the status quo in this case. Even more important, there will be
hardly an opposition to democracy that would be large and powerful enough to overthrow
the system.
11endowments of landowners and landless, which asymptotically converge, re-
gardless of the political environment and the level of public good provision.
As an index of relative inequality in capital endowments, consider the ratio
of individual i’s capital endowment to the average capital endowment per






; i 2 fE;Pg : (12)
We can then state the following result:
Lemma 1. Relative capital endowments of landowners and landless con-
verge over the course of generations, with limt!1 ¸E
t & 1 and limt!1 ¸P
t %
1.
Proof. Using the expressions for average per capita income, and the expres-






= (1 ¡ ®) +
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˜ kt¡1(Gt) + n
+
®˜ kt¡1
˜ kt¡1(Gt) + n
¸i
t¡1: (13)
The initial conditions kE
0 = kP
0 = 0 imply that ¸E
t > 1 and ¸P
t < 1 8t > 0.






˜ k + n
´
+ ®ni
˜ k(1 ¡ ®) + n
;
which depends on the steady state value of ˜ k. Due to unbounded technical
progress, incomes and capital endowments increase over generations, imply-
ing limt!1 ˜ kt = 1. Since land is ﬁxed, using l’Hˆ opital’s rule, this implies
that limt!1 = ¸i
¤ =
(1¡®)
(1¡®) = 1, i 2 fE;Pg, which proves convergence.
Moreover, condition (13) implies that ¸P






@˜ kt¡1 = ®n
(˜ kt¡1(Gt)+n)
2¸P
t¡1 > 0. However, since °¸E
t + (1 ¡ °)¸P




@˜ kt¡1 < 0, which proves the directions of convergence.
The following comparative statics results are useful for later reference:
Lemma 2. Everything else unchanged, the relative capital endowments of
landlords ¸E adapt as follows to changes in the environment: (i) @¸E
t =@a <
0 and @¸E
t =@A < 0, (ii) @¸E
t =@° < 0, (iii) @¸E
t =@n > 0.





















2®˜ kt¡1 > 0 due to the facts that 1=° ¡¸E
t¡1 = (1¡®)(1=° ¡
1) > 0 and that
@¸E
t
@˜ kt¡1 < 0.
12From a certain point during the development process onwards, economic
development and public good provision are complements, in the sense that
from a certain level of development onwards, it is eﬃcient to invest in in-
frastructure, where the eﬃcient level of public good provision is denoted by
G¤.
Lemma 3. There is a unique generation t, for which public good provision
becomes eﬃcient for the economy as a whole, and will be eﬃcient for all
subsequent generations, while it was not eﬃcient for preceding generations:
9 a unique t: G¤
t = 0 8t < t and G¤
t0 > 0 8t0 ¸ t.
Proof. Eﬃciency of public good provision for a generation t implies that
marginal beneﬁts outweigh marginal costs, i.e.
®((1 + G)Atkt)
®¡1 Atkt ¸ 1 :
The result follows since for low levels of development, i.e. k and A, this
condition is not (necessarily) satisﬁed, while monotony of development and
hence growth in A and k ensures that there must be a unique generation t
for which the condition eventually holds.
What sort of public sector would be implemented prior to t? Clearly,
under oligarchy, the elites would simply produce without bothering to set-up
an infrastructure themselves, whose marginal costs for them amount to 1=°.
But even under democracy, no group, neither landlords nor landless, would
endorse public good provision. The landlords, since it would be ineﬃcient,
and the landless, since direct redistribution would beneﬁt them more. Intu-
itively, public goods complement technology in the production process, so if
technology is not suﬃciently advanced, the provision of public goods is not
worthwhile. This leads to the following result.
Lemma 4. Public goods are provided only if it is overall eﬃcient to provide
at least some public goods.
Proof. Net income of individual i from a purely redistributive state is yi +
¿(y ¡ yi). Hence, landless individuals i 2 P enjoy a net gain from redistri-
bution since yP · y, while landlords suﬀer a net loss. Now consider public
good provision. For t < t, the marginal beneﬁt from providing public good
provision is lower than the marginal cost, implying lower net individual in-
come yi(G)(1 ¡ ¿(G)) = yi(G) ¡ G for any individual i when a positive
amount of G is provided, compared to G = 0. Thus, Gtjt<t = 0 under land-
lord oligarchy, as well as under democracy, since in that case the median
voter prefers redistribution to public good provision.
Note also that, even though landlords can decide autonomously about
ﬁnancing and providing public infrastructure G for themselves, by the very
13fact that G is a public good, they cannot exclude landless from using that
infrastructure, and beneﬁtting in terms of income.
Without loss of generality, let us now consider a landlord oligarchy.
While the landless have no inﬂuence on the creation and structure of a pub-
lic sector, the elite, since public good provision is productive, face a trade-
oﬀ between providing it themselves retaining exclusive political power, and
giving up power in exchange for a broader ﬁnancial (tax) basis available for
the public good. Even though starting from an oligarchic system with the
landlord elite monopolizing all political power, eventually democracy arises.
This is shown in the following two results. The ﬁrst one, which reﬂects argu-
ments made by Lizzeri and Persico (2004), implies that eventually the elite
beneﬁts more from giving up political power in exchange for more eﬃcient
production, than from retaining power, regardless of its potential superiority
in terms of conﬂict power. Let GE
t denote the level of public good the elite
would provide if the landlords were to ﬁnance it fully by themselves, while
ˇ Gt denotes the level of infrastructure alternatively provided were democracy
with universal ﬁnancing implemented. Then we have the following result:
Proposition 1. There is a unique generation of landlords ˇ t ¸ t, which is the
ﬁrst generation in the sequence of generations, for which voluntarily oﬀering
democracy with limited redistribution is a strictly dominant strategy:












t ( ˇ Gt) 8t ¸ ˇ t ; (14)
while (14) is not satisﬁed 8t < ˇ t.
Proof. Note that for t < t: Gt = 0, so the elite’s income under democracy is
strictly lower than under oligarchy, whenever ¿ > 0, and (14) does not hold.
However, also note that the marginal income gain of a member of the elite






®˜ k(G) + n
´
³
˜ k(G) + n
´2¡® > 0 : (15)











. This implies, given t > t,






t ), which must
be compared to the respective tax rate faced under democracy. Consider
the respective income of an elitist individual, given the same taxation as
13As a corollary, note that this marginal income gain is larger for the elite than for the
average individual or for a member of the people, for whom in the numerator k or k
P
apply, respectively, instead of k
E.
14under oligarchy, yE





. Given identical gross incomes under both





t ) · 1 ¡
ˇ Gt+T
yt( ˇ Gt). Rearranging, it turns out that this is true if yt( ˇ Gt) ¸
°yE
t (GE
t ). Now note that due to the monotonicity of individuals’ incomes in
G, and since ° < 1=2, the public good provision required under democracy
to make landlords as well oﬀ as under oligarchy is smaller than the value
under oligarchy. On the other hand, even providing the same amount as
under oligarchy, implying the same gross income, would clearly make the
elite better oﬀ under democracy. Note that this could be ﬁnanced under
democracy, while still leaving room for positive redistribution T > 0. As
long as this redistribution is limited to the extent that net incomes are still
higher under democracy, the elite will prefer the latter regime. Moreover,
once democracy is oﬀered, there is no way for the elite to prefer oligarchy to
democracy at a later stage, since this, although eliminating redistribution,
would necessarily decrease G and hence decrease incomes.
However, as indicated before, democratization eventually also arises when
the disenfranchised landless are powerful enough to implement democrati-
zation by force, i.e. when
°kE
t < (1 ¡ °)kP
t ; (16)
provided that it is in their interest to have a democracy.
Proposition 2. There is a unique generation ˆ t, up to which the landlord
elite dominates the landless people in terms of conﬂict power, but starting
with which the landless people overcome the elite in terms of conﬂict power:
9 a unique ˆ t: °kE
t+¿ < (1 ¡ °)kP
t+¿ 8¿ ¸ 0, while the inequality “¸” holds
8¿ < 0.
Proof. The result follows directly from dividing condition (11) by kt and
applying Lemma 1.
This result reﬂects the possibility for a transition towards democracy
under the threat of revolution, as studied by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001,
2003). As a corollary, it is possible to characterize the conditions under
which a particular transition regime arises by referring to the timing of the
respective transitions.
Corollary 1. An economy experiences a democratization from above when
t % ˇ t · ˆ t, while it experiences a democratization from below when t % ˆ t < ˇ t.
An implication of this result is that a strong and entrenched elite is un-
likely to propose a democratic transition. To conclude, given our assumption
about technical progress, there will eventually be a democratic oﬀer in this
15economy, which entails democratization from above, if it is in the elite’s own
interest to extend the suﬀrage, or democratization from below, if the people
have become powerful enough to challenge the elite’s political predominance.
As seen before, the former scenario implies ˇ t · ˆ t, while the latter implies
ˇ t > ˆ t. We now analyze the consequences of both scenarios.
First, consider the case of democratization from below, so the genera-
tion t that approaches ˆ t < ˇ t. In this case, the members of the people can
implement whatever constitution they like. Since we do not allow for ex-
propriation of land-endowments, the landless will always prefer to establish
a democracy in order to set-up a redistribution scheme that allows them to
partake of land rents and capital rents accrueing to the landowners.14 The
decision problem of the median voter, who happens to own no land, would




t (G) + T s.t. T + G ¡ ¿yt(G) · 0; and ¿ ¡ 1 · 0 : (17)
The solution of this problem implies the following results:
Proposition 3. In the case of democratization from below, the emerging
democratic regime is characterized by a public sector with full redistribution,
i.e. ˆ ¿ = 1, eﬃcient public good provision, i.e. ˆ G = G¤ as
@y( ˆ G)
@ ˆ G = 1, and,
consequently, a redistribution scheme of ˆ T = y(G¤) ¡ G¤.
Proof. The results follow directly from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of prob-
lem (17).
Since the landlord elite lacks conﬂict power to eﬀectively inﬂuence this
outcome, they have no possibility to avoid full redistribution of their in-
comes. Nevertheless, however, they have an incentive to fully and optimally
invest their endowments.
It is obvious that the elite will try to avoid such an outcome and attempt
to limit redistribution in democracy as much as they can. This consider-
ation is relevant when the elite can actually propose democracy and the
rules under which democracy should be pursued. In particular, consider the
14We do not allow for discriminatory taxation, which would essentially mean expropri-
ation of part of all endowments, including land. However, for the purpose of the paper,
which is studying the constitutional design in the context of the democratic transition,
this assumption is without loss of generality, see also Cervellati, Fortunato, and Sunde
(2004) for a more general treatment of this issue. We also could relax this assumption
and allow for a proletarian oligarchy appropriating all land resources, which would only
tend to delay the democratization process. Even if people would opt for an oligarchy to
their own favor, due to Lemmata 1 and 4, and analogous to Proposition 1, public good
provision eventually becomes essential also for them as the rulers in a people’s oligarchy.
Hence, there arises a generation in the course of development, during which the proletarian
oligarchs themselves will wish to implement a democratic regime allowing them to share
the costs of public good provision with the previously disenfranchised.
16ﬁrst generation, ˇ t, of the elite for which oﬀering democratization is more
proﬁtable than the status quo of oligarchy. When making the oﬀer of ex-
tending the suﬀrage, they have the possibility to make this oﬀer dependent
on their design proposal for the democratic constitution, in which they ex-
plicitly limit redistribution to ¯ T.15 The consequences of ﬁxing ¯ T ¸ 0 in the
constitution for the allocation of resources, and public goods provision in
particular, are condensed in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. When oﬀering democratization voluntarily (from above),
the ruling elite enforces a suﬃciently low constitutional limit to redistribution
of ¯ T and taxation ¯ ¿. The implemented democratic regime is characterized
by a public sector with the maximum possible redistribution ˇ T = ¯ T, as much
taxation as possible, and ineﬃciently high public good provision, i.e. ˇ G > G¤.
Proof. For illustration purposes, consider the extreme case, when the elite
actually forbids redistribution by constitution, i.e. ¯ T = 0. The people’s
Langrangian of this problem reads Ã L = (1¡¿)yP ¡¸1(G¡¿yP)¡¸2(¿¡¯ ¿).16
Then, consider the case in which people actually tax as much as possible,
so that ˇ ¿ = ¯ ¿ and ¸2 ¸ 0. Then, ¸1 ¸ 1, and by analyzing the ﬁrst
order condition with respect to G, we ﬁnd that
@yP
@G · 1 which implies
by concavity that ˇ G ¸ G¤, with strict inequality if people are not fully
indiﬀerent at full taxation (i.e. if ¸1 > 1). Of course, if the constitutional
constraint is suﬃciently high not to eﬀectively constrain the people’s actions,
the landless median voter could still implement a tax rate of one, induce
eﬃcient public goods provision, and redistribute the residual tax revenues
as transfers. Hence, for the redistribution limit to be a binding constraint,
it must hold that ¯ T < y(G¤) ¡ G¤.
Rigorously speaking, the members of the landlord elite have an incen-
tive to limit redistribution to a minimally possible level, that is, absent
15We assume without loss of generality that a democratic oﬀer conditional on ¯ T ¸ 0
implies that the threat of remaining in the status quo in case the conditional oﬀer is
not accepted by the people, is credible. This, in turn, implies a credibly high level of
¯ T. However, since from Proposition 1 it is clear that the democratic oﬀer from the elite
only occurs for t ¸ t, G > 0 is eﬃcient, so that everyone in the economy is better oﬀ
even after ﬁnancing G with taxes. Hence, members of the people are indiﬀerent in terms
of income between democracy and landlord oligarchy when T = 0, but any small level
of redistribution makes them strictly prefer democracy. Alternatively, they could value
the residual decision rights on the level of G implied by democracy suﬃciently hight to
strictly prefer democracy even for T = 0. On the other hand, renegotiating the oﬀered
constitutional limit to redistribution is excluded by the initial weakness of the people in
terms of conﬂict power, and, on top of that, becomes less and less of an issue for later
generations as incomes and endoments converge according to Lemma 1.
16Note that ¯ ¿ might as well be 1.
17other constraints, they will go for ¯ T = 0.17 Moreover, the results are equiv-
alent if the elite were to enforce a constitutional limit to taxation ¿ < ¯ ¿,
rather than limiting redistribution. Similar arguments apply then, since the
landless will always strictly prefer to spend tax revenues on public goods
as long as G < G¤, rather than on transfers T, because the marginal ben-
eﬁts from infrastructure are higher. Also here, the elite has an incentive
to allow for suﬃcient taxation in order to facilitate eﬃcient public good
provision. Redistribution transfers in this case are determined residually as
ˇ T = ¯ ¿y(G¤) ¡ G¤.
So summarize, our results indicate that eventually a democratic transi-
tion arises. However, the the circumstances under which the transition to
democracy takes place are crucial in determining the constitutional design,
and hence the structure of the economy after democratization. What essen-
tially matters in this respect is the relative bargaining power of the diﬀerent
groups struggling for political inﬂuence in the economy. If the ruling elite
decides voluntarily to give up oligarchic power, it can in exchange inﬂuence
the structure of the democracy to be implemented. If, on the other hand, the
elite tries to hold on to the status quo, but eventually is forced to concede
democratization, the terms of the democratic regime are less favorable for
the oligarchs as their inﬂuence is limited. Consequently, if possible, the elite
optimally trims the constitution to their favor, in particular by limiting the
redistributive activities and and promoting productive, eﬃciency enhancing
activities of the state. Essentially, our results imply that the larger the bar-
gaining power of the elite during the transition to democracy, the smaller
the size of the state in terms of taxes and tax revenues, and the larger the
share of tax revenues spent on the provision of productive public goods,
relative to the share of tax revenues spent on unproductive redistribution.
Another noteworthy issue in this respect is the double cost the elite faces
during the transition to democracy. On the one hand, members of the elite
have to pay taxes, which partly go to ﬁnance redistributive transfers, in case
they cannot be fully avoided. On the other hand, the elite loses the power to
decide about issues such as public good provision, since the residual decision
rights are taken on by the median voter under democracy. The case of de-
mocratization from below shows that the latter fact constitutes the real cost
of democratization, while taxes and implicit redistribution in terms of pro-
portional taxation are only second-order eﬀects. Rather, taxation can very
well be to the elite’s advantage since universal taxation under democracy
allows them to share the costs of public goods provision.
Let us ﬁnally analyze how the dynamics of economic and political de-
velopment are aﬀected by observable characteristics of the economy. In
17Note that this is a consequence of the myopic preferences we assume. If the founding
fathers of democracy care about a stable system with limited social unrest, they are likely
to allow at least for some positive redistribution.
18particular, we investigate the comparative statics of the timing and the con-
sequential regime of a democratic transition with respect to inequality in
land, i.e. n and ° (or n=°, respectively) and technological progress a (or
level of development A) by studying their impact on the crucial state vari-
ables, the stock of physical capital k available in the economy and the level
of inequality in capital endowments implied by ¸E, ¸P (and ¸ := ¸E=¸P).18
The ﬁrst essential information concerns the eﬀect of inequality in capital en-
dowments (or parent’s incomes) on the likelihood of a democratic transition
of either type:
Proposition 5. Everything else equal, larger inequality in capital endow-
ments (or incomes) increases the likelihood of a democratic transition from
above and decreases the likelihood of a democratic transition from below.
Proof. For proving the ﬁrst claim, consider condition (14) and derive both
sides of the condition with respect to ¸E
t . The resulting conditions are ³
˜ k(GE) + n
´® ®˜ k(GE)






®˜ k( ˇ G)
˜ k( ˇ G)+n for
the right hand side, respectively. Since GE < ˇ G, the ratio constituting
the respective second terms is larger for the latter condition. Moreover, ³
˜ k(GE) + n
´®
= y(GE), and hence, since ˇ G = G¤ and since the democratic
oﬀer from above only applies for generations t ¸ t, the ﬁrst term is also
larger for the latter condition, implying that a larger ¸E tends to make a
democratic oﬀer from the elite more likely. Concerning the second claim,
consider (11). Clearly, a larger ¸E (and the implied smaller ¸P) tends to
strengthen the conﬂict potential of the elite, making a democratic transition
enforced by the people less likely.
In other words, higher income inequality tends to result more likely in a
democratization from above, implying a small public sector with little redis-
tribution and a large share of tax revenues spent on infrastructure provision,
and the other way around. The next step is therefore to examine the impact
of exogenous parameters, like a, A, n and ° on the state variables and hence
the dynamic development path.
Proposition 6. Everything else equal, faster technological progress a and
a more industrialized structure of the economy implied by a higher level of
development A lead to a sooner democratization, and increase the likelihood
of a democratization from below. A larger importance of land resources n
increases the likelihood of democratization from above, decreases the like-
lihood of democratization from below, and has an ambiguous eﬀect on the
timing of democratization. Finally, a smaller elite of landowners ° implies
18Due to the assumption that capital can be only formed through bequests, consid-
ering inequality in endowments is equivalent to considering inequality in incomes of the









19sooner democratization but an ambiguous eﬀect on the relative likelihood of
the diﬀerent regimes occurring.
Proof. Note that, following Lemma 2, @¸E
@a < 0 and @¸E
@A < 0, such that
a transition from above is less likely. Moreover, consider the eﬀects of a















< 0, making a transition from below according to con-
dition (11) more likely, i.e. decreasing ˆ t. Finally, note that A or a, respec-
tively, increase the level of eﬀective physical capital ˜ k, and hence increase
the desirability of public goods provision according to Lemma 3 leading to
a lower ˇ t, and therefore unambiguously to a sooner transition regardless
of the transition regime. To see the second claim, again consider condi-
tion (11), and note that a larger n strengthens the elite’s relative conﬂict
power, hence increasing ˆ t, while, from Lemma 2, n increases ¸E, and there-
fore, by Proposition 5, implies a lower ˇ t. Finally, a smaller ° tends to










° , thus decreasing ˆ t. On the other
hand, from Lemma 2, a smaller ° implies a larger ¸E, and thus a lower
ˇ t.
This result implies that oligarchies with smaller elites tend to be less
stable and disintegrate sooner. The same is true if economic development is
faster, which is in line with empirical ﬁndings by Boix and Stokes (2003) that
economic development speeds up the arrival of democratization. Moreover,
faster growth and higher levels of development tend to favor democrati-
zation from below, implying larger welfare states, while economies where
land resources are important tend to rather democratize on the initiative
of the landlord elite, implying constitutions with small public sectors and
little redistribution. Interestingly, land resources make no clear prediction
on the timing of democratization, while the size of the elite seems to be am-
biguous with respect to the transition regime and hence the constitutional
design. The following section brieﬂy discusses these implication in the light
of historical evidence.
4 The Historical Context and Empirical Relevance
The main implications of the model presented in the last section corre-
spond well with empirical ﬁndings of earlier empirical contributions. Re-
cently, the interdependencies of democratization, sustainability of democ-
racy and economic development have received a revived research interest
among economists and political scientists. Some contributions found that
economic development apparently serves to stabilize democratic systems,
20but found no causal eﬀect of economic development on the timing of democ-
ratization, see Przeworski et al. (1997, 2000). Recent empirical evidence,
however, seems to indicate that there is a positive causal eﬀect of economic
development on the probability that a country democratizes as well as a
positive eﬀect of development on the stability of democracies, see Boix and
Stokes (2003).
Moreover, evidence suggests that economic development together with
the political institutions in place determine the size of the public sector, as
well as its structure in terms of infrastructure and transfers, such as un-
employment beneﬁts, health care and retirement pensions, see Boix (2001),
who also ﬁnds that public sectors are signiﬁcantly larger under democratic
than under oligarchic regimes. Alesina and Glaeser (2004, ch. 2) provide ev-
idence concerning redistribution in the U.S. and European countries, which
experienced entirely diﬀerent transitions towards democracy. With regard
to the transition scenario corresponding to the theoretical model, the U.S.
as well as the U.K. experienced democratic transitions from above, which
were mainly initiated and determined by ruling classes and landowners, com-
pare also the description in Lizzeri and Persico (2004). On the other hand,
France, and also Germany, rather experienced transitions that were charac-
terized by substantial pressure on the elites to extend the franchise.19 In
close concordance to the theoretical predictions, the size of the public sector
as measured by total government spending in the year 2000 is larger in the
latter countries, with government spending of around 30 and 37 percent in
the U.S. and the U.K., respectively, while the corresponding numbers for
France and Germany are about 49 and 43 percent, respectively, compare
Alesina and Glaeser (2004, Table 2.1). The theoretical predictions with
regard to the structure of the public sector, as measured by the share of
public spending on purely redistributive activities such as social programs,
is also in line with empirical evidence. In 1998, the U.S. and the U.K. spent
around 14.6 percent and 24.7 percent of all expenditures on social programs,
while France and Germany spent 29 percent and 27 percent, respectively,
see Alesina and Glaeser (2004, Table 2.2), indicating a tendency towards
more redistribution in countries that experienced a democratization from
below.
The predictions that higher levels of development tend to favor democ-
ratization from below, as well as that the importance of land resources tend
to favor democratization from above are supported by the ﬁndings of Boix
(2001). Diﬀerent regressions of the size of the public sector using a large
panel data set of countries not only reveal a larger public sector in democ-
19While the French democracy essentially goes back to the revolution of 1789, extension
of the franchise in Germany was associated with several waves of social unrest, as was the
case for the revolution in 1848, the socialist movement which led Bismarck to introduce the
welfare state, and the revolution in 1919 to mention just the most prominent milestones
of the transition.
21racies, but in particular a negative eﬀect of the size of the share of the
agricultural sector in total production as well as a positive eﬀect of per
capita income on the size of government, see Boix (2001, Table 3).
Acemoglu and Robinson (2004, ch. 2) provide a survey of the cross-
country evidence on the patterns of democracy. Their main conclusions
are that richer countries are more likely to be democratic, that more equal
countries are generally less likely to be democratic, and that democracies are
more redistributive than oligarchies with an increase in redistribution follow-
ing democratization. All these facts are in line with the theoretical predic-
tions. In particular, we have shown that richer countries on a higher level of
economic development experience a democratic transition sooner, and that
a larger elite (larger °) tends to delay the democratic transition. Moreover,
the model implies that redistribution primarily arises under democracy, in
particular if the extension of the franchise happened under the pressure of
conﬂict from the people.
Some important issues still remain to be addressed. After their critique
of the work of Przeworski et al. (1997, 2000), Boix and Stokes (2003) claim
that the most puzzling, yet unanswered questions regarding the links be-
tween economic development and democratization concern the ﬁndings of
diﬀerent eﬀects of economic development on the propensity to democratize
in diﬀerent historical contexts. In particular, they raise the question why
early during industrialization oligarchies appear to have been less stable to
democratization than at later stages of development, and why economic
development after World War II seems to have mainly helped to stabi-
lize democracies rather than to induce democratization of non-democratic
regimes. This paper provides a simple answer: because the economies that
democratized early on diﬀer in several other respects than the level of eco-
nomic development from those economies that democratized later, or have
not democratized yet altogether. In particular, the distribution of power
among oligarchs and people might diﬀer substantially due to diﬀerent cap-
ital accumulation histories, land resources, and group sizes, thus making
comparisons only in terms of level of development diﬃcult. However, more
empirical work needs to be done to rigorously test the implications of the
theory, and to show that these are in line with the historical experience.
Nevertheless, from the results presented so far we conclude that the model
squarely ﬁts the historical facts.
5 Conclusion
We have provided a simple dynamic model of economic and political devel-
opment that is able to reproduce several recent theories about the endoge-
nous transition towards democracy and the determinants of the design of
constitutions within a single framework. The main mechanism implies that
22economic development is a prerequesite for a democratic transition. More-
over, depending on the economic environment, this transition is triggered
either by the ruling elite in the initial oligarchy, leading to a democratiza-
tion ‘from above’; or by the initially disenfranchised people, whose threat to
go to open conﬂict and mount a revolution initiates a democratic transition
‘from below’. However, we show that the transition regime is crucial for
the design of the democracy after the transition. In particular, the more
inﬂuence the elite has, as exempliﬁed by the situation of a democratization
from above, the more it will be able to tilt the constitutional design towards
its own favor, for example by implementing constitutional limits to redistri-
bution or taxation. On the other hand, if the elite is forced by the people
to democratize, its inﬂuence on the constitutional design are limited, imply-
ing a larger public sector, and a larger weight of redistributive purposes in
public expenditure. The implications of the model are shown to be in line
with empirical ﬁndings and historical facts.
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